Foundations for Bayesian Updating

submitted by: dougramsey
We provide a simple characterization of updating rules that can be rationalized as Bayesian. Namely, we consider a general setting in which an agent observes finite sequences of signals and reports probabilistic predictions on the underlying state of the world. We study when such predictions are consistent with Bayesian updating, i.e., when does there exist some theory about the signal generation process that would be consistent with the agent behaving as a Bayesian updater. We show that the...

Dynamic Mechanism Design

submitted by: dougramsey
I will consider the design of efficient and profit-maximizing Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanisms for general dynamic environments with private information. In the environment, agents observe a sequence of private signals over a number of periods. In each period, the agents report their private signals and choose public (contractible) and private actions based on the reports. The probability distribution over future signals may depend on both past signals and past decisions. The general...